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A COMPOSITE INDEX OF COMPETITION1 
 
Lino Briguglio and Gordon Buhagiar2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The measurement of competition in a given country is an issue of great importance given 
the widely-held belief that competition helps allocate resources efficiently, resulting in 
improved consumer welfare. Competition might contribute significantly to growth and 
equitability in the distribution of income (Mehta, 2002).  The Competition Index (CI) 
proposed and constructed in this paper will take into account the variables that are thought 
to have a bearing on the nature of competition within a country’s markets.3 
 
There are various benefits that could be derived from the constructing of a CI. Such an 
index could gauge the extent of competition that exists within a country’s markets and for 
across country comparisons. If measure over time, it could indicate the extent to which a 
country is enhancing competition within its domestic market. Also since the index 
proposed here is a composite one, the individual components would give an indication as 
to areas of competition strengths and weaknesses.  
 
 
2. The Structure of the Competition Index 
 
The index proposed in this paper combines (a) the quality of a competition authority’s 
activities and (b) the competition constraints existing in a given country.  
 
Six variables were considered, namely:   
1. Length of time for which Competition Policy has been in place 
2. Enforcement of Competition Law 
3. Independence of the Competition Authority 
4. Competition Advocacy  
5. Barriers to Trade  
6. Competition Culture  
 
The reasons for including the six variables are given below. 
 
The data was obtained by means of a survey which contained five questions relating to the 
first five variables listed above. The respondents were asked to assign a score of 1 to 5, 
with 1 indicating the lowest possible incidence and 5 the highest possible. The fifth 
variable was constructed from an independent sources, as explained below.   
 
The responses to the survey came from different types of competition authorities, with 
some respondents being officials of an autonomous entity and others representing 
government departments responsible for competition policy. In all 32 authorities 
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responded by the end of August 2004, which was the cut-off date point for the purposes of 
this study.4. 
 
3. The Variables and the Responses 
 
Time period for which Competition Law has been in Force 
 
This variable seeks to gauge the level of experience of a country’s Competition Authority. 
It is expected that the longer the competition law has been in force the more experience 
the competition authority will be to the nature of competition in its domestic markets. 
Such experience should make the implementation of the law more effective and relevant 
to the country’s economic development, the pattern of international trade and other 
economic variables. Such changes to a jurisdiction’s competition law can only be 
introduced following direct experience with the effects of implementation.  
 
The score of 1 was allocated to a time period of up to five years, two to a period of 
between 6 and 10 years, 3 to a period of between 11 and 20 years, 4 to a period between 
21 and 30 years and 5 to a period of over 30 years. Table 1 shows the length of time for 
which competition legislation has been in force in the countries that responded to the 
survey. 
 
Table 1.  Experience in Competition Legislation 
 
Over 30 Years United Kingdom, Canada, the United States of America, Japan, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and Pakistan.  
21 to 30 Years Australia, New Zealand, France, Greece and Portugal. 
 
11 to 20 Years Italy, Sweden, Taiwan, Belgium, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus. 
6 to 10 Years The Netherlands, Mexico, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Malta and Zambia. 
0 to 5 Years South Africa, Barbados, Morocco and Serbia. 
 
 
Extent of Competition Policy Enforcement 
 
Enforcement is the key to the effectiveness of any legislation. Competition law is no 
exception. It is assumed here that sanctions are directly related to enforcement. Sanctions 
are intended to ensure the cessation of an activity which is in breach of the law and to 
signal to potential offenders that their actions will be costly.  
 
If a competition authority is too lenient with offenders, it would encourage further 
breaches of competition law. Also, undertakings and/or consumers that suffer the 
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consequences of anti-competitive behaviour would tend to reluctant to complain to the 
Competition Authority of such behaviour if they feel that very little will be done by the 
Authority. On the other hand, if an authority is known to impose sanctions when 
necessary, firms and/or consumers would be encouraged to complain, thereby improving 
the Competition Authority’s ability to enforce competition law more effectively. 
 
Respondents were asked to rate the level of enforcement of competition law that is 
implemented in their jurisdictions, using the imposition of sanctions as a guide to the 
chosen rating. Thus, if no sanctions are imposed, respondents were to check box one for 
“Little or no Enforcement”, whilst if sanctions are imposed frequently they were to check 
box five for “Very Strong Enforcement”.   The questionnaire contained a guide to 
respondents to improve comparability of the responses. The different degrees of 
enforcement of the different countries, indicated by the respondent themselves, are shown 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Degree of Enforcement of Competition Law 
 
Very strong 
enforcement 
UK, Canada, USA, Australia, Mexico, The Netherlands and South 
Africa 
Strong 
enforcement 
 
Japan, New Zealand, Finland, Norway, France, Italy, Slovakia, and 
Taiwan. 
Moderate 
enforcement 
Denmark, Portugal, Estonia, Greece, Sweden, Belgium, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Morocco, Zambia and Malta. 
Mild 
enforcement    Austria, Slovenia, Pakistan, Switzerland and Barbados. 
Little or no 
enforcement Serbia. 
 
In the comments concerning enforcement that were submitted by respondents, mention 
was made of recent improvements to competition legislation that strengthened 
enforcement by means of stronger sanctions against violations. A number of countries use 
a variety of means to enforce the law, including divestiture orders for concentrations, 
investigations and asking for remedies to be made prior to the authorization of a 
concentration, as well as the imposition of fines for entities breaching the law. Among the 
problems faced by different countries in enforcing the provisions of competition law, a 
shortage of staff seemed to be an issue with more than one jurisdiction. In other instances, 
respondents mentioned that enforcement in their country was mild due to the competition 
authority not being empowered to impose fines. 
 
Degree of Autonomy 
 
This variable seeks to define the level of independence that a competition authority enjoys 
from government interference. There seem to be mixed views concerning this aspect of 
competition policy. The International Competition Network (2003) identifies two models 
in this regard.  
 
The first model involves complete integration within the national administration of the 
body responsible for competition policy implementation. This model seems to be 
associated with “strong formal powers (being given) to the competition authority to 
intervene in legislation” (Capacity Building and Technical Assistance, 2003: 31).  
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The second model is one that is fully independent from the government and decisions 
made by the competition authority are virtually free from government influence. The ICN 
report views this model as having a weak influence on competition policy, as a result of 
its separation from the government, and its ability to influence state policy is seen as 
depending on its advocacy activities. 
 
For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the more independent a competition 
authority is the greater will be its contribution to competition within is jurisdiction. As 
Shyam Khemani (1997: 25) put it, “The best watchdog of competition is an impartial, 
independent competition law enforcement agency”.  
 
Thus, respondents were instructed to select a ranking of one for a very low level of 
independence up to a ranking of five for a totally independent authority.  
 
Only four countries responded that they have a low degree of independence of their 
national competition authority. These are Morocco, Pakistan, Malta and Serbia. The rest 
have competition authorities that are considered to be either ‘totally independent’ or ‘very 
independent’. 
 
Among the comments submitted for this component of the index, it emerged that most of 
the respondents’competition law-implementing bodies, even if these are government 
departments and not autonomous entities, enjoy a degree of freedom of action, but depend 
on the national administration for funding.   
 
Sixteen countries with a high degree of independence also registered high scores in the 
areas of advocacy and enforcement. This would seem to suggest that an independent 
competition authority is able to adopt a strong enforcement stance and liberally advocate 
to all sectors and institutions in society, including the government.  
 
However, thirteen countries show a high score in the independence of the competition 
authority yet low scores of three or less in one or both of the fields of enforcement and 
advocacy. The evidence is therefore not conclusive as to the importance of the degree of 
independence to an authority’s ability in carrying out its responsibilities. 
 
Level of Competition Advocacy 
 
Advocacy is an essential tool for the fostering an understanding of competition policy and 
law. Mehta (2002) noted that poor performance of competition policy and law in the Asia-
Pacific region resulted mainly from a failure to understand the importance of competition 
advocacy. When used well, advocacy plays a preventative role by discouraging anti-
competitive practices and is therefore crucial for the effectiveness of a competition 
authority. As a guide to respondents in this question, reference was made to the list of 
advocacy activities in the International Competition Network’s Advocacy Toolkit (ICN, 
2002) available on its website, and respondents were asked to rate the level of competition 
advocacy practiced by their competition authority. As usual, they were instructed to select 
one for “no advocacy”, two for “very limited advocacy” and so on until a ranking of five 
for a “very high level of advocacy”. 
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Only three countries gave themselves the top score of five for their level of advocacy 
whilst twenty-one countries chose a score of four, six countries gave it a three and three 
countries gave their advocacy practices a score of two, as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Level of Advocacy 
Very high level 
of advocacy UK, USA and Mexico. 
High level of 
advocacy  
Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Finland, Norway, 
Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Taiwan, Costa Rica, Slovenia, South Africa, Morocco, 
Switzerland and Zambia. 
Moderate 
advocacy Austria, Estonia, Greece, Belgium, Cyprus and Malta. 
Very Limited 
advocacy Pakistan, Barbados and Serbia. 
 
Only three countries gave themselves the top score of five for their level of advocacy 
whilst twenty-one countries chose a score of four, six countries gave it a three and three 
countries gave their advocacy practices a score of two. Table 4 displays the different 
levels of advocacy practiced by the participating countries. 
 
The respondents who commented on this area mentioned a number of advocacy activities 
carried out in their country. One of the most common of these activities is the submission 
of comments by the competition authority to ministries on the competition issues 
concerning legalisation. Publications and conferences that promote the benefits of 
competition are also widely used by the countries that participated in the CI.  
 
 
Table 4. Level of Advocacy 
Very high level 
of advocacy UK, USA and Mexico. 
High level of 
advocacy  
Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Finland, Norway, 
Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Taiwan, Costa Rica, Slovenia, South Africa, Morocco, 
Switzerland and Zambia. 
Moderate 
advocacy Austria, Estonia, Greece, Belgium, Cyprus and Malta. 
Very Limited 
advocacy Pakistan, Barbados and Serbia. 
 
 
Entry and Import Barriers 
 
The survey question on this variable attempted to gauge the opinions of respondents about 
the nature of barriers to entry of new firms in their country’s markets as well as barriers to 
imports.  This was the most difficult question for respondents to answer for the simple 
reason that barriers to entry are likely to vary considerably from one market to another. 
Respondents were instructed to use their experience in giving a general definition of how 
strong or otherwise they felt that barriers to trade were in their country. Both barriers to 
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the entry of new firms and barriers on imports are considered as being detrimental to 
competition within a country’s markets.  
 
Strong links are known to exist between barriers to entry and the competitive behaviour of 
firms in many industries (Bain, 1956). The stronger the barriers to the entry of new firms 
into markets, the more concentrated are those markets will tend to be, with negative 
effects on competition.  
 
The same can be said about barriers to trade, especially those intended to protect local 
firms, since these reduce substitution possibilities for the consumer, and enable the 
protected firms to control prices of products competing with imports (Khemani, 1997).  
 
Again the data for the variable “entry and trade barriers” was obtained from the survey 
responses. Respondents were instructed to assign a score of one if they felt that their 
country had “very high barriers to entry”, two if there were “high barriers to trade” and so 
on up to five for “minimal or non-existent barriers to entry”.5 
 
The scores assigned by the respondents with regards to entry and trade barriers are shown 
in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Entry and Trade Barriers 
Minimal or non- 
existent barriers  New Zealand and Estonia. 
Low barriers 
UK, Canada, USA, Australia, Japan, Norway, Denmark, France, 
Italy, Austria, The Netherlands, Sweden, Greece, Portugal, Taiwan, 
Belgium, Slovakia, Slovenia, Morocco and Pakistan. 
Moderate 
barriers  Finland, Mexico, Costa Rica, Malta and Barbados. 
High barriers Cyprus, Switzerland, South Africa, Zambia and Serbia. 
 
Many respondents expressed difficulty in assigning a general score to this area, since 
barriers to the entry of new firms are different for different sectors.  
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The Extent of Competition Culture 
 
The existence of a competition culture is considered to be fundamental for the active 
participation of all the affected sectors in society, whether consumers, businesses or 
regulatory bodies, in ensuring that competition prevail freely in a country’s markets.  
 
The “competition culture” variable could be considered as the other side of the coin of the 
advocacy variable in the sense that the latter has more to do with the action of the 
competition authority, whereas the former has more to do with society in general. For this 
reason, it was decided that the competition authority was not the right respondent for a 
question on Competition. 
 
 Instead, a proxy variable was used to indicate the likely nature of the competition culture 
in a country. The variable chosen for this purpose was per capita GDP. The reason for this 
choice is that countries with a low GDP per capita are likely to be more protection 
oriented, as is the case in most Least Developed Countries (LDCs), whereas countries 
with the highest GDP per capita (including North American and Western European 
Countries) are likely to be more pro-competition. Admittedly this is assumption is 
somewhat arbitrary, since it a priori assigns high scores to high income countries.6  
 
The rankings assigned to each country in terms of competition culture was again 1 to 5, 
based on 2001 figures on GDP per capita. Countries with a GDP per capita of   $13,000 or 
higher were given a score of 5. GDP per capita $9,000 to $12,999 was given a score of 4, 
whereas that between $5,000 and $8,999 was given a score of 3. The score of 2 was 
assigned to the range of $ 2,000 to $4,999 and the score of 1 to a GDP per capita under 
$2,000. The source of the data was UNCTAD (2003). These results are summarised in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Competition Culture 
Very Strong 
Competition 
Culture 
UK, Canada, USA, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Finland, 
Norway, Denmark, France, Italy, Austria, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Belgium and Switzerland.  
Strong 
Competition 
Culture 
Greece, Portugal, Taiwan, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Barbados. 
Moderate 
Competition 
Culture 
Mexico 
Weak 
Competition 
Culture    
Slovakia, Estonia, Costa Rica, South Africa 
Very Weak 
Competition 
Culture 
Morocco, Pakistan, Zambia and Serbia. 
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4. The Composite Index of Competition 
 
The Composite Index of Competition was computed as a simple average of the six 
components, as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. The Competition Index 
 
Source: Data for legislation, enforcement, independence, advocacy and barriers to entry are taken from responses to 
survey. Data on competition culture is based on GDP per capita and derived from UNCTAD (2003) Handbook of 
Development and Trade Statistics 
 
It can be seen from Table 6 that the highest scores pertain to Western European Countries, 
USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with the UK obtaining the top ranking.  
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UK 5 5 5 5 4 5 4.83 1 
Canada 5 5 5 4 4 5 4.67 2 
USA 5 5 4 5 4 5 4.67 3 
Australia 4 5 5 4 4 5 4.50 4 
Japan 5 4 5 4 4 5 4.50 5 
New Zealand 4 4 5 4 5 5 4.50 6 
Finland 5 4 5 4 3 5 4.33 7 
Norway 5 4 4 4 4 5 4.33 8 
Denmark 5 3 4 4 4 5 4.17 9 
France 4 4 4 4 4 5 4.17 10 
Italy 3 4 5 4 4 5 4.17 11 
Austria 5 2 5 3 4 5 4.00 12 
Netherlands 2 5 4 4 4 5 4.00 13 
Sweden 3 3 5 4 4 5 4.00 14 
Greece 4 3 5 3 4 4 3.83 15 
Mexico 2 5 5 5 3 3 3.83 16 
Portugal 4 3 4 4 4 4 3.83 17 
Taiwan 3 4 4 4 4 4 3.83 18 
Belgium 3 3 4 3 4 5 3.67 19 
Slovakia 3 4 5 4 4 2 3.67 20 
Estonia 3 3 5 3 5 2 3.50 21 
Slovenia 3 2 4 4 4 4 3.50 22 
Cyprus 3 3 5 3 2 4 3.33 23 
Switzerland 2 2 5 4 2 5 3.33 24 
Costa Rica 2 3 5 4 3 2 3.17 25 
Malta 2 3 3 3 3 4 3.00 26 
South Africa 1 5 4 4 2 2 3.00 27 
Barbados 1 2 4 2 3 4 2.67 28 
Morocco 1 3 3 4 4 1 2.67 29 
Pakistan 5 2 2 2 4 1 2.67 30 
Zambia 2 3 4 4 2 1 2.67 31 
Serbia 1 1 1 2 2 1 1.33 32 
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Five respondents are new EU member states, and it is surprising that the Eastern/Central 
European ones (Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia) registered higher scores than the 
Mediterranean ones (Malta and Cyprus). 
 
Relationship between the C.I. Scores, GDP per Capita and Population Size 
 
The C.I. scores obtained for the 33 participating countries were regressed against the 
countries’ Gross Domestic Product and their population in order to establish whether any 
relation existed with these variables.  
 
It was found that a statistically significant correlation exists between the C.I. scores and 
GDP, with a relatively high correlation coefficient (R2 = 0.8) and a t-statistic on the 
gradient equal to 6.9. This is a plausible result.7  
 
With regard to the relationship between the CI scores and population size, a positive 
correlation was detected, but the correlation coefficient (R2 = 0.24) and the t-statistic on 
the gradient (t = 1.33) indicated that the relationship was not statistically significant.  
 
5. Some Weaknesses of the Competition Index 
 
The main weakness of this CI is its reliance on the method of self-assessment, which does 
not provide as objective an analysis as would be desired. However, this weakness was to 
an extent minimised by providing respondents with guidelines for the rankings that they 
were to select for each of the five survey questions. These guidelines were intended to 
render the responses as comparable as possible.  
 
Another shortcoming of the CI is its limited coverage of countries. Out of over seventy 
member countries of the International Competition Network, only the 32 countries that 
responded to the survey submitted for this study were included in the CI. Whilst these 32 
countries hail from all continents, thus representing a broad perspective of experiences in 
the field of competition, the inclusion of more jurisdictions would have allowed a more 
meaningful comparison. 
 
The subjective choice of variables included in the computation of the CI is another 
weakness of this study. However, subjectivity is a characteristic of all composite indices.  
 
Another weakness of the index relates to the choice of scoring scale for measuring the 
components of the index. The choice of the 1 to 5 range was subjective. A narrow range 
would have rendered the dispersion too narrow to be of value, whereas a wider range, 
though desirable, would have created a more meaningful dispersion, but would have 
rendered the responses more difficult. A five-point scale was considered the best for the 
purpose of this exercise. 
 
The weighting chosen was also subjective. There is not scientific was in which to assign 
weights. One may consider assigning different weights, depending for example, on what 
some average weighting suggested by the respondents in terms of the importance of the 
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components. But this raises additional problems, particularly if the respondents have 
divergent views as to what weighting to assign. 
 
Finally, the competition culture variable was assumed to be directly related to GDP per 
capita. It should be stated here that the results would not have differed much if this 
variable was excluded. As already explained, however, it was decided to retain this 
variable in this study to emphasise its importance in the index. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
 
This paper, and the dissertation on which this paper is based, attempted to construct a 
competition index based on responses to a questionnaire by 32 countries. The major 
conclusions that can be derived from this study are that (1) competition is multifaceted 
and an index which measures competition should contain a number of components which 
foster competition; (2) countries with the highest competition scores are those considered 
as advanced in economic terms; and (3) there does not seem a statistically significant 
correlation between country size and competition scores. 
 
The results are interesting, but they have to be interpreted with great caution, given the 
weaknesses described in section 5. It is hoped that further study on this subject will 
produce a more reliable index based on data which are more objectively constructed, and 
covering a wider range of countries.  
 
  
References 
 
Bain, J.S. (1956). Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in 
Manufacturing Industries, U.S.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Briguglio, L. and E. Buttigieg, (2003). “Competition Constraints in Small Jurisdictions,” 
Note submitted by Malta under Session III of the Global Forum on Competition, 
OECD. 
 
International Competition Network (2002). “Toolkit for Effective Advocacy,” 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/toolkit_intro.html, accessed in July 
2004. 
 
International Competition Network (2003). “Capacity Building and Technical 
Assistance,” report prepared by Working Group on Capacity Building and 
Competition Policy Implementation, International Competition Network. 
 
Khemani, R. S. (1997). “Competition Policy and Economic Development,” Policy 
Options, October 1997: 23-27. 
 
Mehta, P.S. (2002). “Competition Policy in Developing Countries: an Asia-Pacific 
Perspective,” Bulletin on Asia-Pacific Perspectives, 2002/03: 79-87. 
 
